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ABSTRACT
THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
The Far-Reaching Effects of Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendments
In 2004, thirteen states passed same-sex marriage ban amendments in response 
to a Massachusetts ruling from the previous year that sanctioned marriage for gay 
couples.  Most of the amendments contained two prongs that defined marriage and also 
prohibited legal recognition of unmarried relationships in an attempt to avoid marriage 
substitutes, such as civil unions.
These amendments not only blatantly discriminate against same-sex couples by 
barring them from marriage, but the amendments also insidiously cause further damage 
by using undefined and ambiguous language capable of discriminating against gays 
and lesbians in ways not admitted by the proponents and not intended by the voters.  
One such unintended consequence is occurring in the State of Ohio where the 
Amendment is being interpreted to exclude both homosexual and heterosexual 
unmarried couples from the state’s domestic violence laws.  Several state courts have 
held that the domestic violence laws conflict with the recently-enacted Amendment by 
unlawfully recognizing a legal status for unmarried couples.
This Note will address the duplicity of marriage amendments and discuss the 
aftermath as it is unfolding for domestic violence victims in Ohio.  While the courts are 
unlikely to allow this unintended consequence affecting domestic violence victims to 
proceed, it is unfortunate that the intended consequence of intolerance towards gays
will continue.
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THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
The Far-Reaching Effects of Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendments
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” – Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
I.  INTRODUCTION
What does same-sex marriage have to do with domestic violence?  Dozens of 
domestic violence victims in Ohio are asking themselves that very question.  In 2004, 
Ohio passed a same-sex marriage ban amendment that not only eroded equality for 
gays and lesbians, but also eliminated the rights of unmarried domestic violence victims 
– both gay and straight.      
The citizens of Ohio got more than they bargained for when they passed the 
Marriage Amendment1 (hereafter referred to as the “Amendment”).  Like many of the 
states that passed amendments in 2004,2 Ohio’s Amendment has the dual purpose of
restricting marriage to heterosexual couples and prohibiting the state from recognizing
other types of unmarried relationships similar to marria ge.  The alleged purpose of the 
second “recognition” clause is to prevent the state from recognizing out-of-state same-
sex marriages or civil unions.3  However, the clause is written so broadly and 
ambiguously that it is capable of discriminating against gays and lesbians in ways not 
admitted by the proponents and not intended by the voters.
This Note will focus on one such consequence where the Amendment is being 
interpreted to exclude both homosexual and heterosexual unmarried couples from the 
state’s domestic violence laws.  Several courts have held Ohio’s domestic violence laws 
conflict with the recently-enacted Amendment by unlawfully extending protection to 
unmarried cohabitants “living as a spouse.”4
This distorted interpretation must fail and the Ohio Supreme Court should 
ultimately conclude the domestic violence laws do not conflict with the Amendment.  
Unfortunately, the broader problem of having a vague and discriminatory marriage 
amendment enshrined in the state constitution will remain and will inevitably lead to 
other consequences unintended by the voters.5
1 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.  The Marriage Amendment, referred to as “Issue 1” on the ballot, was 
adopted by initiative petition on November 2, 2004 and became effective on December 2, 2004.  It reads: 
“Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state 
and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal 
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage.”
2
 Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.
3
 State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812, at ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).  See also Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage, The Facts about Issue 1, 
http://www.ohiomarriage.com/Facts_About_Issue_1.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
4 See infra Part V.
5 See infra Part V.D.
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Amendments that bar homosexuals from marriage are destructive enough by 
themselves, but the proponents of these measures are taking their intolerance one step 
further by trying to dismantle any legal rights that same-sex couples have managed to 
achieve for themselves.  Only a handful of states provide legal recognition for same-sex 
relationships,6 which leaves same-sex couples forced to create their own private 
contractual agreements to protect themselves and their families.  Proponents seek to 
strip away these rights by expanding the marriage amendments to prevent the states 
from recognizing any other legal relationships formed by gays and lesbians.   
The proponents, however, face a quandary over how to achieve this goal.  The 
United States Constitution has a pesky Equal Protection Clause7 that prohibits 
discrimination against a class of citizens when the law is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.8  Unfortunately for the proponents of these measures, 
animosity does not suffice as a legitimate purpose.9  Thus, the proponents resort to 
using vague language to hide their discriminatory intent – all the while masking th eir 
true intent from voters and attempting to avoid a constitutional challenge.    
The result of this contortionist act is bad law.  The proponents’ attempt to enact 
language that discriminates without outright discriminating has led to poorly-drafted 
marriage amendments that are subject to perverse interpretations. As demonstrated in 
Ohio, these broad amendments will inevitably lead to unintended consequences.  
This Note will address the duplicity and inherent danger of the marriage 
amendments, and discuss the aftermath as it is unfolding for domestic violence victims 
in Ohio.  Part II of this Note gives a brief overview of the current status of same-sex 
marriage in the United States, at both the state and federal level.  Part III includes a 
general discussion about same-sex marriage ban amendments, and explains why the 
states have been enacting them.  Part IV discusses Ohio’s Marriage Amendment in 
detail, including analysis of the Amendment language and the intent behind its 
enactment.  Part V considers the unintended consequences of the Amendment as it 
pertains to Ohio’s domestic violence laws.  This section examines the domestic violence 
cases at issue, with analysis showing the Amendment should not be interpreted to 
invalidate the domestic violence laws.  Part VI provides general commentary on the 
consequences of these ambiguous marriage amendments and reflects on the future of 
marriage amendments.   
6
 Massachusetts is the only state that allows gay marriage.  The following states have some form of legal 
recognition for same-sex relationships, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships: California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and Vermont.  See infra Part II.B-C.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
8
 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-33 (1996). 
9 Id. at 634 (holding that laws “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582-583 (2003) (O’Conner, J., 
concurring) (finding that “moral disapproval of this group [homosexuals], like a bare desire to harm the 
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause”).
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II.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A.  Federal Law
State marriage laws were typically considered under the purview of the states10
until 1996 when President Clinton signed the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA).11 Congress enacted DOMA in response to a Hawaii Supreme Court ruling12
finding the state’s same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, which Congress feared 
would lead to same-sex marriage in Hawaii and recognition of same-sex marriage 
across the country.13  DOMA defines marriage at the federal level as between one man 
and one woman,14 and creates an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause15 of the 
United States Constitution by permitting states to refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages granted in other states.16  It is arguable that DOMA violates the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires all of the states 
recognize the records and judicial proceedings of the other states.17 To ensure DOMA’s 
viability, President George W. Bush publicly supports a federal amendment to the 
United States Constitution banning same-sex marriage,18 and the 109th Congress is 
considering a constitutional amendment to do so.19
10
 Dominick Vetri, The Gay Codes: Federal and State Laws Excluding Gay & Lesbian Families, 41 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 881, 891 (2005).  
11
 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
12
 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).  See infra Part III.A. for discussion of Baehr.
13 See Troy King, Same-Sex Couples: Defining Marriage in the Twenty-First Century: Marriage Between a 
Man & a Woman: A Fight to Save the Traditional Family One Case at a Time, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
57, 65 (2005) (describing the impetus for the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
14
 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (which reads: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”). 
16
 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C). 
17 See George W. Bush, Remarks by the President: President Calls for Constitutional Amendment 
Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-
2.html) (admitting that DOMA could be struck down by the courts.).  For arguments that DOMA violates 
the United States Constitution, see generally Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of 
Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Mark Strasser, “Defending” Marriage in Light 
of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-Lawrence Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster After 
Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 421 (2005); Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next 
Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684 (2004).  But see Lynn D. Wardle, Non-
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
365 (2005) (arguing that Congress has the authority to enact DOMA under the Effects Clause of the Full 
Faith and Fair Credit Clause).  
18 See George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/2004120-7.html (warning that “activist judges” may 
redefine marriage, in which case a constitutional marriage amendment would be required); George W. 
Bush, Remarks by the President: President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 
24, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html (arguing that a 
constitutional amendment is necessary to “protect marriage in America”).
19
 Marriage Protection Amendment, Sen. Wayne Allard (R-CO).  S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005).  The 
text reads: “Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.  Neither 
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B.  State Law
Massachusetts is currently the only state granting full marriage rights to same-
sex couples.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court forced the state legislature to permit 
same-sex marriage after its 2003 ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.20
Goodridge held that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated both equal 
protection and due process under the state constitution,21 which “forbids the creation of 
second class citizens.”22  The court decided the marriage ban “arbitrarily” denied access 
to the benefits and protections of marriage provided by the state23 and concluded the 
marriage restriction was “rooted in persistent prejudices against . . . homosexual[s].”24
Finding no relation between the ban and the state’s alleged purpose of protecting 
children and families, the court found permitting same-sex couples to marry actually 
achieves the state’s goal of preserving stable families and creating a secure child-
rearing environment.25 Massachusetts has granted over 6,600 marriage licenses since 
May 2004, with the state suffering no visible detrimental effects.26
The Goodridge decision only benefits residents of Massachusetts.  The state 
supreme court recently held that out- of-state couples may not be married in 
Massachusetts if their home state would prohibit the marriage.27  This essentially 
restricts same-sex marriage to the citizens of Massachusetts because the other 49 
states prohibit gay couples from marrying.  Forty-five states have either statutory 
Defense of Marriage Acts (commonly referred to as “mini-DOMAs”) or state 
constitutional amendments restricting marriage to a man and a woman.28 The 
this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal 
incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.”  For a 
discussion on the constitutionality of a federal marriage amendment, see Joan Schaffner, The Federal 
Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity of Marriage or Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1487 (2005). 
20 Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
21 Id. at 961. 
22 Id. at 948.
23 Id. at 949.
24 Id. at 968.
25 Id. at 962-64, 969.
26 See Editorial, The Normality of Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A14; Pam Belluck, 
Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A14.  
27
 Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, SJC-09436, 2006 WL 786227, at *4 (Mass. Mar. 30, 2006) 
(holding state law prohibits the state from granting marriage licenses to non-residents where the marriage 
would be prohibited by the non-residents’ home jurisdiction).  
28
 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.  See Kavan Peterson, 
Washington Gay Marriage Ruling Looms, Stateline.org, Mar. 29, 2005 (updated Nov. 23, 2005), 
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=137&languageId=1&contentId=20695.  
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remaining four states29 do not have specific laws barring same-sex marriage, but the 
restriction is implicit by use of the terms “husband” and “wife” in the laws.30
C.  Marriage Substitutes: Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships
A handful of states have created alternatives to marriage in an effort to give
same-sex couples the same rights and responsibilities of marriage without actually 
calling it “marriage.”  The Vermont Legislature was forced to create civil unions31 in 
1999 by a state supreme court decision holding the state constitution required Vermont 
to extend the same benefits and protections of heterosexual marriage to same-sex 
couples.32  The Connecticut Legislature, in contrast, voluntarily enacted its civil union 
act in 2005.33  California,34 Hawaii,35 Maine,36 and New Jersey37 all have some form of 
domestic partnership benefits that provide same-sex couples with legal rights.  
While these legal relationships offer state benefits similar to marriage, they fall far 
short of true equality under the law.38  Quasi-marital relationships fail because they are 
not recognized outside the borders of the state and they do not entitle the couple to the  
1,138 federal laws and policies39 available to married couples.40 While certainly better 
than no legal protection at all, marriage substitutes continue to be state -sanctioned 
disparate treatment based on a person’s identity.41
29
 New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and Rhode Island.  See Kavan Peterson, Washington Gay 
Marriage Ruling Looms, Stateline.org, Mar. 29, 2005 (updated Nov. 23, 2005), 
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=137&languageId=1&contentId=20695.
30
 Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current Controversies in the Marriage Debate, 18 
BYU J. PUB. L. 569, 575 & n.25 (2004).
31 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2006). 
32
 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).
33 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38aa to 38oo (West 2006).
34 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297-299.6 (West 2006) (called “domestic partners”).
35 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 to C-7 (2006) (called “reciprocal beneficiaries”).
36 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2006) (called “domestic partners”).
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-1 to A-12 (West 2006) (called “domestic partnership”).
38 See In Re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (advisory opinion 
holding that a proposed bill to create civil unions in response to the Goodridge decision does not comply 
with the state’s equal protection clause and is an “unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory status for 
same-sex couples”). See also Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage Versus 
Unions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 783 (2005) (arguing that civil unions are not “separate but equal” to marriage).
39 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT, GAO-04-353R 
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.  
40
 State-sanctioned same-sex marriage, such as that permitted in Massachusetts, also fails to provide 
same-sex couples with full marriage equality.  The federal Defense of Marriage Act bars same-sex 
marriages from receiving federal benefits, and allows other states to refuse to recognize out-of-state 
same-sex marriages. Dominick Vetri, The Gay Codes: Federal and State Laws Excluding Gay & Lesbian 
Families, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 881, 885-87 (2005).  
41 But see Nancy K. Kubasek, Alex Frondorf & Kevin J. Minnick, Civil Union Statutes: A Shortcut to Legal 
Equality for Same-Sex Partners in a Landscape Littered with Defense of Marriage Acts, 15 J. LAW & PUB. 
POL’Y 229 (2004) (defending civil unions as an incremental step towards equality).
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III.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BAN AMENDMENTS
A.  Background: Setting the National Stage for Passage of Marriage Amendments
The State of Hawaii was the first state to resort to amending its state constitution 
to ensure that its statutory marriage laws would remain intact.  The Hawaii Supreme 
Court ruled in 1993 that Hawaii’s law restricting marriage to opposite sex couples was 
discriminatory based on sex,42 but the Hawaii Supreme Court later found the case 
moot43 after the voters of Hawaii approved an amendment in 1998 granting the 
legislature the authority to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples.44
Alaska faced a similar situation in 1998 when a lower court found the right to 
choose a life partner was a fundamental right triggering a strict scrutiny standard.45
Before further court proceedings could determine if the state had a compelling interest, 
the voters of Alaska passed a referendum restricting marriage to opposite sex 
couples.46
While Hawaii and Alaska amended their constitutions to circumvent judicial 
decrees in their own state, the State of Nebraska became the first state to enact a 
marriage amendment as a preemptive measure against other states’ marriage laws.  
Nebraska enacted its same-sex marriage ban amendment47 in 2000 in response to 
Vermont’s creation of civil unions.48
Other states soon followed Nebraska’s lead after the State of Massachusetts 
legalized same-sex marriage in its 2003 Goodridge decision.49  This ruling ignited fear in 
the states because they feared their own state courts would similarly find their mini-
DOMAs unconstitutional, and they were also concerned about being forced to recognize 
out-of-state marriages, notwithstanding the federal DOMA. Thus, the states responded 
with a flurry of constitutional amendments in 2004 designed to stave off simila r rulings in 
their own states.50 All thirteen states51 with marriage amendments on the ballot in 2004 
passed the measures.  
42
 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).  For analysis claiming discrimination against gays and 
lesbians should be classified as “sex discrimination” and thus should receive heightened scrutiny, see 
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 197 (1994).
43
 Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
44 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (a one-sentence amendment that reads: “The legislature shall have the power 
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
45
 Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. 
Feb. 27, 1998).
46 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.   
47 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
48 See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive Framework for Understanding 
the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 221, 229 (2004/2005).
49 Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).  See supra Part II.B.
50 The voter information pamphlet for the Ohio Amendment specifically stated that the Amendment would 
prohibit judges in Ohio from redefining marriage like the judges of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
THE OHIO BALLOT BD., OHIO ISSUES REPORT, STATE ISSUE BALLOT INFORMATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 2, 2004 
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B.  Summary of State Marriage Amendments
A total of nineteen states have amended their state constitutions to restrict 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.52 The amendments generally fall into two categories: 
narrow amendments that solely define marriage as between heterosexual couples, and 
broad amendments that contain a second clause restricting recognition of homosexual 
relationships.53  Six of the nineteen states have the narrow definitional amendments.54
The remaining states, including Ohio, went further by enacting broad amendments that 
prohibit state recognition of all other marital-like relationships.55  For the sake of brevity 
and clarity, this Note will refer to these second clauses as “recognition” clauses.56
The recognition clauses were enacted to prevent the states from recognizing out-
of-state same-sex marriages and other quasi-marital relationships, such as Vermont’s 
civil unions or California’s domestic partnerships.57  Of the twelve states that passed 
recognition clauses, only two states use the actual term “same-sex” when describing the 
type of prohibited relationships.58  The earliest state to enact such an amendment was 
Nebraska, and a district court subsequently struck it down based on equal protection 
grounds because the recognition clause singled out same-sex relationships.59
GENERAL ELECTION, at 4 (2004), available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/electionsvoter/2004/OIR2004.pdf. See also The Ohio Campaign to 
Protect Marriage, Mission Accomplished!, http://www.ohiomarriage.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2006) (The 
Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, the leading proponent of Ohio’s Amendment, attributed the success 
of the marriage amendments to the Goodridge decision by stating: “In an odd sense, we thank the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for what they did in attempting to force their morality on the rest of 
the nation.  Homosexual activists have over played their hands and it appears to be the very catalyst that 
has awakened the church . . . .”). 
51
 Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.
52
 Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Utah.     
53
 Hawaii does not fall into either category.  Hawaii’s amendment was unique in that it did not actually 
define marriage, but rather granted power to the state legislature to “reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.”  For a comparison of the state marriage amendments, see Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, 
and Structure: An Interpretive Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 221 (2004/2005).  
54
 Alaska, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon.
55 Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Utah.  
56 See William C. Duncan, The Litigation to Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social Meaning, 18 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 623 (2004) (using the term “recognition law” for state laws that restrict recognition of other state-
sanctioned same-sex relationships).  See also Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An 
Interpretive Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 221 
(2004/2005) (referring to the broad amendments as “substance amendments” and further classifying 
subsets as either a “relationship model,” “recognition model,” or “hybrid model”).
57
 State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812, at ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).  See also Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage, The Facts about Issue 1, 
http://www.ohiomarriage.com/Facts_About_Issue_1.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).  
58
 Georgia and Nebraska.
59
 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (appeal pending). 
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Ohio60 and the other states enacting marriage amendments in 2004 took a 
lesson from the pending Nebraska case61 and refrained from using homosexual-specific 
language in their amendments by referring to either “unmarried” relationships62 or using 
some other neutral language.63  This effort to hide their discriminatory intent to avoid a 
similar constitutional challenge resulted in overbroad, sweeping recognition clauses that 
are responsible for the unintended consequences stemming from the marriage 
amendments, as demonstrated in Ohio.  
IV.  OHIO’S MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
A.  Ohio’s Existing Law Relating to Same-Sex Marriage
The definition of marriage was already codified in state law when the voters 
passed the Marriage Amendment in 2004.  Ohio’s existing mini-DOMA statute had the 
dual purpose of limiting marriage to one man and one woman,64 and prohibiting state
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages or other similar legal relationships.65
The statute specifically prohibited extending “statutory benefits of a legal 
marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or different 
sexes.”66  However, the legislature was wise enough to include instruction that this 
prohibition would not be construed to:
(a) Prohibit the extension of specific benefits otherwise enjoyed by all 
persons, married or unmarried, to nonmarital relationships between 
persons of the same sex or different sexes, including the extension of 
benefits conferred by any statute that is not expressly limited to married 
persons . . . ;
(b) Affect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid under 
the laws of this state.67
The legislature also included legislative intent to explain the purpose of 
the mini-DOMA was to define marriage and to ensure that “substitutes for 
marriage,” such as Vermont’s civil unions, are not to be recognized by the state.
60
 Ohio’s recognition clause may still be subject to some of the same arguments raised in Bruning, 
notwithstanding the attempt to draft a non-discriminatory amendment by avoiding the term “same-sex 
relationship.” See infra Part.IV.B.2.
61
 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (appeal pending).
62
 Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
63
 Kansas (“No relationship, other than marriage, shall be recognized . . . .”); Michigan (“[Opposite-sex 
marriage] shall be the only agreement recognized . . . .”); North Dakota (“No other domestic union, no 
matter how denominated, may be recognized . . . .”); Texas (“[The state] may not create or recognize any 
legal status identical to or similar to marriage.”); and Utah (same as North Dakota).
64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A). 
65 Id. at § 3101.01(C)(2),(4).  
66 Id. at § 3101.01(C)(3).  
67 Id. at § 3101.01(C)(3)(a),(b).  
C. Susie Lorden Page 12 of 35
It also reiterated that there was no intent to affect other benefits enjoyed by all 
persons, either married or unmarried, same-sex or opposite-sex.68
These caveats ensured that the statute would cause no more damage other than 
its intended purpose of restricting marriage to heterosexual couples.  The statute and 
the legislative intent clearly state that the statute was not intended to affect other 
relationships.   
Oddly enough, the proponents of the Ohio Marriage Amendment did not use this 
established statutory language already enacted by the legislature, even though their 
stated purpose was the same.  Instead, the proponents cho se to use untested 
language, which left the Amendment open to interpretation – and lawsuits.
B.  Analysis of Ohio’s Amendment Language
Ohio’s Amendment not only defines marriage, but also contains a sweeping 
second clause that restricts the state’s recognition of unmarried relationships.  The 
Amendment reads as follows:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid 
in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.  This state and 
its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage. 69
1.  Ambiguous Language
The Amendment uses vague, undefined terms that have no established legal 
meaning in Ohio.  No one really knows what types of relationships “intend” to 
“approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”  Qualities of 
marriage?  Effect of marriage?  These words set a subjective standard that could be 
interpreted to abolish any type of relationship that is normally considered a natural 
benefit of marriage or has “overlapping factual characteristics in common with 
marriage.”70  For instance, spouses inherit property from each other intestate; thus, 
inheriting property could be defined as an effect or quality of marriage.  An unmarried 
couple entering into a private contractual agreement to inherit each other’s property 
upon their deaths could easily be interpreted as intending to approximate the effect of 
marriage.  If the aggrieved next of kin decided to challenge this private agreement, the 
Amendment could render the private contract unconstitutional as a court might hesitate 
to enforce an agreement between unmarried persons that “intends to approximate the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”  The same could be true of 
68
 H.B. 272, § 3, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004).
69 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
70
 Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 
2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
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inheritance, joint property rights,71  powers of attorney, adoptions, custody agreements, 
medical decision-making, health benefits: any type of legal benefit normally granted to 
married couples is at risk of being annihilated for unmarried couples.
2.  Comparison to Nebraska’s Unconstitutional Amendment
The district court in Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning72 found 
Nebraska’s amendment that prohibit ed recognition of same-sex relationships “similar” to 
marriage to be overly broad because it “potentially prohibits or at least inhibits people, 
regardless of sexual preference, from entering into numerous relationships or living 
arrangements that could be interpreted as a same-sex relationship ‘similar to’ 
marriage.”73 Nebraska’s amendment was restricted to same-sex relationships and the 
court still found it to be overly broad.74  In comparison, Ohio’s convoluted recognition 
clause that prohibits recognition of unmarried relationships that intend to “approximate 
the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage” is certainly “both exceedingly 
vague and overly broad”75 because it sweeps in any unmarried  relationship that could 
be considered similar to marriage.  
Similar to Nebraska, Ohio’s Amendment is both too narrow and too broad in that 
it does not address the stated purpose of the amendment, which was to “preserve 
marriage.”76  It is too narrow in that it does not prevent other “potential threats to . . . 
marriage, such as divorce.”77  The Amendment is also too broad in that “it reaches not 
only same-sex ‘marriages,’ but many other legitimate associations, arrangements, 
contracts, benefits and policies.”78
Bruning’s conclusion that there was an “inadequate fit” between Nebraska’s 
stated goal of preserving marriage and the “breadth”79 of the amendment is also 
applicable to Ohio’s Amendment.  The goal of promoting and protecting family stability 
would be advanced by “expanding the rights and creating responsibilities of registered 
domestic partners.”80  Instead, Ohio’s Amendment, like Nebraska’s, actually frustrates 
71
 State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 880 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), aff’d, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 
827411 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (discussing the possibility that the Amendment could hypothetically 
affect business partnerships that grant joint property rights because the business partners are in an 
unmarried relationship that “intends to approximate the qualities of marriage” by granting joint tenancy 
rights).  
72
 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (appeal pending).
73 Id. at 995.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 THE OHIO BALLOT BD., OHIO ISSUES REPORT, STATE ISSUE BALLOT INFORMATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 2, 
2004 GENERAL ELECTION, at 4 (2004), available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/electionsvoter/2004/OIR2004.pdf.
77
 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002 (D. Neb. 2005) (appeal pending).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1004.
80 Id.
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this goal by preventing couples from forming stable relationships with incumbent legal 
responsibilities.81
C.  Proponents Concealed True Intent and Effect of the Amendment
The proponents use “protecting marriage” as an emotional pretext to enact 
purposefully vague amendments that hide their far-reaching implications from the 
voters.82  While the true intent of the proponents is to discriminate against gays,83 they 
cannot allow this hidden agenda to manifest itself in the words of the amendment.  
1.  Proponents’ Intent Behind the Amendment 
Citizens for Community Values (CCV), a conservative Cincinnati group 
associated with Focus on the Family, sponsored the Amendment and was the driving 
force behind its enactment.84  The President of CCV85 was also the Chairperson of the 
Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, the political action committee instrumental in 
passing the Amendment.86  While publicly these groups may have implied the 
Amendment was about “protecting marriage”87 and was not about attacking gays, 
privately their Web sites reveal a far more vicious intent.  CCV’s Web site has a lengthy 
diatribe about the evils of homosexuality, wherein it calls homosexuality, along with 
rape, incest, pedophilia, and bestiality, “a distortion of God's intention for human 
sexuality."88  It argues people have a right to treat gays differently by calling it 
“legitimate discrimination” and says "homosexual behavior is unhealthy and destructive 
to the individual, to families, and thus to communities and to society as a whole."89  CCV 
complains that society has “succumbed" to the “gay agenda” by granting domestic 
partner benefits and including sexual orientation in employment discrimination laws.90
81 Id.
82 See Thomas Oliphant, Op-Ed, The Gay Marriage Deception, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2004, at D11 
(discussing how the Amendment was used as a cover for stripping gays of contractual rights).
83 Wilson Huhn, Ohio Issue 1 Is Unconstitutional, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 16 (2005).
84 Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal at 1, State v. McIntosh, No. 
2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005).  See also Michelle Goldberg, 
Homosexuals Are Hellbound!, SALON.COM, Oct. 18, 2004 (describing Citizens for Community Values’ 
relationship to the Amendment); Alan Johnson, Bill Would End Domestic-Violence Loophole: Issue 1 
Created Disparity in Law for the Unmarried, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 2005, at 1C (same).
85
 Phil Burress.  
86 Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal at 1, State v. McIntosh, No. 
2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005).  
87 THE OHIO BALLOT BD., OHIO ISSUES REPORT, STATE ISSUE BALLOT INFORMATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 2, 
2004 GENERAL ELECTION, at 4 (2004), available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/electionsvoter/2004/OIR2004.pdf (The marriage amendment on Ohio’s 
November 2004 ballot was called the “Marriage Protection Amendment” by its proponents, the Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage.  The purpose of the Amendment was to “preserve” marriage as between 
one man and one woman, and to prevent marriage from being “alter[ed] and undermine[d].”).
88
 Citizens for Community Values, “The Homosexual Issue” Where Do We Stand? And Why?, 
http://www.ccv.org/Homosexuality-Where_CCV_Stands.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
89 Id.
90 Id.
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The article ends by asking its readers to join CCV by "resisting, on every front, the 
organized effort to normalize homosexual behavior in our society."91
Other proponents of the Amendment did not hide behind their Web sites, but 
rather publicly admitted their true feelings about homosexuality.  A vice chairman of the 
conservative Constitution Party of Ohio, another proponent of the measure, stated 
during a public debate on the issue that homosexuality is a sin that “merits 
discrimination” and that he supported the “criminalization of homosexuality.”92
2.  Proponents Purposefully Obscured Effect of the Amendment from Voters
The language of Ohio’s Amendment did not “fairly inform voters of the impact of 
the amendment beyond marriage.  It use[d] vague language that obscure[d] the fact that 
certain protections for same-sex couples, such as [domestic partnerships], would be 
banned by the amendment.”93  This prevented Ohio voters from casting “an intelligent 
and informed ballot.”94
The voter information guide provided to Ohio voters included one page each of 
arguments in support of and in opposition to the Amendment.95  The Ohio Campaign to 
Protect Marriage provided the arguments in support and stated the Amendment would: 
1) define marriage as one man and one woman; 2) exclude homosexual and bigamous 
marriages; 3) prevent Ohio courts from forcing the state to recognize same-sex 
marriage; and 4) prevent the government from using tax dollars “to give official status, 
recognition and benefits to homosexual and other deviant relationships that seek to 
imitate marriage.”96  Presumably this last statement refers to domestic partnership 
benefits, but the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage did not clearly define what it 
meant.  It also stated the Amendment would not “interfere in any way with the individual 
choices of citizens as to the private relationships they desire to enter and maintain” or 
interfere with government benefits awarded to individuals in homosexual relationships 
as long as the benefits are not being granted because the relationship imitates 
marriage.97
Several of these comments appear to refer to domestic partnerships, but in 
staying true to the ambiguous nature of the Amendment, the proponents hid behind the 
elusive legalese of the measure and did not clearly identify if or how it would specifically 
91 Id.
92
 Michelle Goldberg, Homosexuals Are Hellbound!, SALON.COM, Oct. 18, 2004; Alan Johnson,
Homosexuality Should Be Crime, Proponent of State Issue 1 Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 2004, at 
5B.
93
 Brief of Interested Parties, Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Florida Marriage Protection 
Amendment at 2, No. SC05-1563 (Fla. 2005), available at
http://www.nclrights.org/cases/pdf/FL_ballot_initiative_opnbrief.pdf.
94 Id. at 25.
95 THE OHIO BALLOT BD., OHIO ISSUES REPORT, STATE ISSUE BALLOT INFORMATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 2, 
2004 GENERAL ELECTION (2004), at 4-5, available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/electionsvoter/2004/OIR2004.pdf.
96 Id. at 4. 
97 Id.
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affect or limit domestic partner benefits, or any other legal rights for same-sex couples.  
The Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage did openly admit its intent to prohibit domestic 
partnership rights on its Web site,98 yet it failed to clearly inform the voters of that 
agenda in the voter pamphlet.  
The proponents’ refusal to come clean about the elimination of domestic 
partnership rights in the voter pamphlet suggests they were making calculated attempts 
to hide the unpopular consequences of the Amendment from the public.  The 
proponents’ hesitancy to reveal the truth may have been because the majority of the 
public favors legal rights for gays and lesbians.  Exit polls in the 2004 election showed 
that 60% of the public supported some form of legal recognition for same-sex couples, 
either in the form of same-sex marriage (25%) or civil unions (35%).99  A Pew Research 
Center survey in August 2004 revealed that 80% of Americans were supportive of legal 
recognition for gays (32% supported same-sex marriage and 48% supported civil 
unions).100  With these statistics, the proponents probably feared the Amendment would 
fail if they fully disclosed the purpose as stripping gays and lesbians of contractual and 
domestic partnership rights in addition to banning same-sex marriage.   
The proponents’ duplicity is further demonstrated by their actions taken after the 
passage of the Amendment.  The attorney who drafted Ohio’s Marriage Amendment 
has sued an Ohio university to stop its employee domestic partner benefits program.101
Again, this was clearly the proponents’ intent from the beginning, yet they were not  
candid with the voters about it.      
  More disturbing is the proponents’ broad application of the Amendment after its 
passage.  Citizens for Community Values has filed an amicus brief in one of the cases 
challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic violence law, arguing that the 
Amendment does indeed render Ohio’s domestic violence law unconstitutional as 
applied to unmarried cohabitants who are “living as a spouse.”102 CCV stated that “an 
exact duplication of marriage by non-marital relationships . . . is not necessary in order 
to trigger the prohibition of the amendment.  The Marriage Amendment does not call for
any more than an intention to approximate marriage in any one of the announced 
respects.”103 (Emphasis added.)  It also stated the Amendment prohibits “the very legal 
recognition of the [unmarried] relationships in the first place, for any purpose.”104
(Second emphasis added.)  This is further proof that the Amendment was not just about 
98 Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, The Facts About Issue 1, http://www.ohiomarriage.com (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2006).  
99
 CNN.com, Election Results, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2006).  
100 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS,  
ABORTION AND RIGHTS OF TERROR SUSPECTS TOP COURT ISSUES (2005). 
101
 Brinkman v. Miami Univ. (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Butler County Nov. 22, 2005).  See infra Part V.D for 
discussion of this lawsuit.
102 Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal at 5, State v. McIntosh, No. 
2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005).   
103 Id. at 6-7.  
104 Id. at 8.  
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defining marriage.  The proponents of this measure seemingly want the vague language 
construed as broadly as possible to reach into the lives of gays and lesbians in ways 
beyond simply restricting marriage.                   
V.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF OHIO’S MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
Soon after the Amendment took effect in December 2004, unmarried defendants 
charged with domestic abuse began filing motions to dismiss the domestic violence 
charges.  Dozens of defendants have challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic 
violence laws as applied to unmarried couples.105  They allege use of the term “living as 
a spouse,” which is used to define household members for purposes of the domestic 
violence law, violates the state constitution by creating a legal status for unmarried 
couples that approximates marriage in violation of the recently-enacted Amendment.106
In order to fully discuss this distortion of the Marriage Amendment and its 
implications, it is important to understand the unique problems posed by domestic 
violence and to review Ohio’s specific domestic violence law.  
A.  Background on Domestic Violence
Ohio established criminal and civil remedies for the crime of domestic violence in 
1979.107  Prior to that, domestic abuse had been treated as a private family matter and 
often not viewed as a crime.108  Domestic violence occurs when one partner exerts 
physical and emotional control over his or her intimate partner in a pattern of abuse 
through the use of fear, humiliation, economic dependency, verbal or physical assaults, 
and the threat of future violence.109 Domestic violence occurs in same-sex relationships 
105 See infra Part V.C.
106
 This creative defense was discovered by a law clerk working in the Public Defender’s Office that was 
defending Frederick Burk, one of the first defendants to use this argument.  See Kerry Howley, Assault 
Ambiguity: Marriage Bans and Domestic Abuse; Ohio Marriage Law, REASON, July 1, 2005, at 12(2); 
State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212, at ¶ 25 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 
86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005)  
107 STANLEY MORGANSTERN & BEATRICE SOWALD, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
LAW § 5:1 (Thomson/West 2005). 
108 See State v. McIntosh, No. 2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 
2005) (describing the history of domestic abuse and the hesitancy of the police to arrest batterers, which 
prompted the state to enact the crime of domestic violence); Brief of Appellant at 28, State v. Burk, No. 
86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (describing the “Rule of Thumb,” which 
permitted husbands to beat their wives as long as the rod was “no larger than the diameter of his thumb”); 
Brief of Appellant at 28 n.7, State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) 
(citing State v. Black, 1864 WL 1041 (N.C. 1864)) (explaining that in the 1800’s, a North Carolina court 
specifically stated the husband was allowed to beat his wife as long as he did not inflict permanent injury 
or use excessive force. “[T]he law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain.”); Pamela 
M. Jablow, Note, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic 
Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1097-98 (2000) (discussing the history of domestic 
abuse).
109
 Michelle Aulivola, Note, Gay and Lesbian Families in the 21st Century: Outing Domestic Violence: 
Affording Appropriate Protections to Gay and Lesbian Victims, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 162, 163 (2004).
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at about the same rate as heterosexual relationships (25% to 33%).110  Gay and lesbian 
victims, however, suffer from an additional layer of complications not faced by their 
heterosexual counterparts.111  Abusers exercise added control over victims by 
threatening to “out” them to their families and co-workers.112  Homosexuals are often 
leery of an inadequate response from the police or domestic violence shelters,113 and 
five states limit their domestic violence laws to heterosexual couples.114  In contrast, 
Ohio courts have taken a progressive role in broadly interpreting the state’s domestic 
violence laws to openly include homosexual relationships.115
B.  Ohio’s Domestic Violence Law
The Ohio Legislature recognized the “special nature” of violence in the home 
when drafting its domestic violence statute.116  The legislature created increased 
penalties for subsequent offenses to address the problem of recurring violence, and it 
authorized temporary and civil protection orders to protect victims from their intimate 
abusers.  The legislature clearly “believed that an assault involving a family or 
household member deserves further protection than an assault on a stranger.”117
Ohio’s domestic violence laws purposefully encompass many individuals who 
have an intimate or familial relationship to the batterer.  The law protects people from 
being abused by a “family or household member,”118 which is broadly defined to include 
the following persons who are residing or have resided with the abuser: a current or 
former spouse, a person living as a spouse, a parent or child of the offender, or any 
110
 Mary Beth D. Collins, Note, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Addressing the Issues for the Proper 
Protection of Victims, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 99, 100 (2002).
111
 For in-depth analysis on the problem of same-sex domestic violence, see generally Michelle Aulivola, 
Note, Gay and Lesbian Families in the 21st Century: Outing Domestic Violence: Affording Appropriate 
Protections to Gay and Lesbian Victims, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 162 (2004); Adele M. Morrison, Queering 
Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and 
Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 81 (2003); Tara R. Pfeifer, Comment, Out of the Shadows: The Positive Impact of 
Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1251 (2005); 
Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93 (2005).
112
 Michelle Aulivola, Note, Gay and Lesbian Families in the 21st Century: Outing Domestic Violence: 
Affording Appropriate Protections to Gay and Lesbian Victims, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 162, 164 (2004).
113 Id. at 164-67.
114
 Delaware, Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, and South Carolina.  Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-
Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 106 
(2005).
115
 State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1098, 1101 (Ohio 1997) (holding that Ohio’s domestic violence laws 
include same-sex couples); State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (same); State 
v. Linner, 665 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (Ohio Hamilton Mun. Ct. 1996) (same).
116 State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (1997).
117 Id. at 1129.
118
 The crime of domestic violence is defined as “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause 
physical harm to a family or household member,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(A) (Baldwin 2005), and 
“No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to family or household member,” OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2919.25(B) (Baldwin 2005).  
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other person related by blood or marriage to the offender.119  It also includes a person 
who has had a child with the offender, irrespective of whether they have resided 
together.120  Thus, the statute is by no means limited to marital relationships.  It protects 
nieces and nephews, aunts and uncles, children, stepchildren, parents, stepparents, 
grandparents, boyfriends, girlfriends: anyone with an intimate or familial relationship 
who has resided with the batterer.  In fact, the statute would not cover a married couple 
who had never lived together.121  This demonstrates the statute was simply designed to 
protect all kinds of cohabitating people from intimate violence, and did not premise this 
protection on a legal marital status.  
The descriptive term “living as a spouse” is used to define cohabitating 
individuals who are not married or related by blood or marriage.122  The statute does not 
define “cohabitating,” and the courts have broken down cohabitation into two elements: 
sharing of familial or financial responsibilities,123 and consortium.124  The courts have 
held that domestic violence “arises out of the relationship between the parties” based on 
these factors, 125 and that each case must be decided on a case-by-case basis.126
Again, this reinforces that the domestic violence laws are not premised on a legal 
marital status, but rather on the facts of the intimate relationship between the parties in 
question.    
1.  Same-Sex Domestic Violence
Ohio courts have taken great strides in keeping the domestic violence laws 
accessible to all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation.127  Ohio courts first held that 
the domestic violence statute applies to same-sex couples in State v. Hadinger 
(1991).128 Hadinger reasoned that the broad language of the statute implied the 
legislature’s intent to “provide protection to persons who are cohabitating regardless of 
their sex” and to interpret the statute otherwise “would eviscerate the efforts of the 
legislature to safeguard, regardless of gender, the rights of victims of domestic 
violence.”129
119 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(F)(1) (Baldwin 2005).  
120 Id.
121
 State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812, at ¶ 32 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
122 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(F)(2) (Baldwin 2005) (“Living as a spouse” is further defined in the 
statute as “a person who is living or has lived with the offender in a common law marital relationship, who 
otherwise is cohabitating with the offender, or who otherwise has cohabitated with the offender within five 
years prior.”).
123 State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (1997) (defining sharing of familial or financial 
responsibilities as including “shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets”).
124 Id. at 1130 (factors of consortium include “mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society, cooperation, 
solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal relations”).
125 Id. at 1129.
126 Id. at 1130.
127 State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 875, 881 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), aff’d, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 
827411 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (explaining that Ohio’s domestic violence laws have consistently
been interpreted broadly to protect both gay and straight unmarried persons and have “never been 
interpreted narrowly or restricted to protecting only those in a traditional heterosexual marriage”).
128 State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
129 Id.
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The courts reaffirmed the state’s commitment to protecting same-sex couples 
when the court upheld a domestic violence charge in a lesbian relationship in State v. 
Linner (1996).130 The Linner case was more expansive in its reasoning and proposed 
that the domestic violence statute would be found unconstitutional on equal protection 
grounds if it were to apply only to heterosexuals by excluding homosexuals.131  One 
year later in State v. Yaden (1997), the court again confirmed that same -sex couples 
deserve the same protection as heterosexual couples, and observed the legislature 
implicitly condoned the inclusion of same-sex couples in the domestic violence laws by 
failing to amend the statute to exclude gay and lesbian couples during the four times the 
legislature amended the statute since Hadinger was decided. 132 These cases reinforce 
the notion that the domestic violence laws are not interrelated to marital status by 
extending domestic violence protection to gays and lesbians who cannot be married. 
2.  Consequences of Removing Domestic Violence Protection
Domestic violence laws are tailored to address the unique dynamic of a repetitive 
crime involving an offender and victim who have an intimate relationship and often live 
in the same home.  In most cases of assault, the victim may safely return to her home, 
and lock her doors to keep out her assailant.  In domestic violence cases, the victim 
returns to find her assailant living in her home.  Ohio’s domestic violence laws include 
specialized protections for domestic violence victims that would otherwise be 
unavailable if it were prosecuted as a crime other than domestic violence. 
a.  Punishment
The punishment for domestic violence addresses the repetitive nature of the 
crime where the batterers continue to abuse their partners; thus, the punishment 
increases with the number of convictions.  The first offense of domestic violence is a 
misdemeanor, while second and third offenses are elevated to felonies with increased 
jail time and fines.133  The increase in jail time is important because studies have shown 
that batterers are less likely to commit violence if they serve jail time.134
130 State v. Linner, 665 N.E.2d 1180, 1185 (Ohio Hamilton Mun. Ct. 1996).
131 Id. at 1184.
132 State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1098, 1101 (Ohio 1997). 
133
 A first offense of domestic violence is a first degree misdemeanor, punishable by up to six months in 
jail and a fine of up to $1000.00, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(D)(2) (Baldwin 2005).  A second 
offense is a fourth degree felony, punishable by a possible prison term of six to twelve months and a fine 
of up to $2500.00, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(D)(3) (Baldwin 2005).  Third and subsequent offenses 
of domestic violence are third degree felonies, punishable by possible prison terms of one to five years, 
and fines of up to $10,000.00, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(D)(2) (Baldwin 2005).  See also State v. 
Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212, at ¶¶ 2-3 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 
2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (describing the difference between domestic violence 
and assault charges).
134 Sara Catania, No Safe Haven, The Counselor, MOTHER JONES, August 2005, at 49.     
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 If the defendant cannot be charged with domestic violence, he or she may be 
charged with assault.135  The definitions for the two crimes are the same, except the 
domestic violence statute is restricted to harm inflicted on a “family or household 
member.”136  While the definition of the crimes may be similar, the punishments are not.  
All assaults are misdemeanors punishable by six months in jail and a $1000.00 fine, 137
which is the equivalent of a first offense of domestic violence.  The penalties for assault 
are not enhanced by subsequent offenses and remain the same regardless of how 
many times the defendant may have assaulted the particular victim.138
b.  Protection Orders
Victims of certain violent crimes, including domestic violence139 and assault, 140
are eligible for temporary protection orders (TPO) after a criminal complaint has been 
filed against the defendant.  The TPO prevents the defendant from going to the victim’s 
residence,141 which is imperative since both the defendant and the victim often reside in 
the same home.  Temporary protection orders are limited in that they remain in effect 
only until the disposition of the criminal case,142 or in the case of domestic violence, until 
a civil protection order is granted.143
Domestic violence victims have the option of obtaining a civil protection order144
(CPO) at any time, which is far more expansive and superior to a TPO in several ways.  
Civil protection orders last up to five years,145 and they are not contingent on a criminal 
charge being filed.  The court may grant a CPO at any time based upon a showing of 
domestic violence against a “family or household member,”146 which is defined using the 
same terms as the criminal domestic violence statute.147  Civil protection orders address 
many of the unique problems faced by domestic violence victims.  The court may force 
135
 State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212, at ¶ 27 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 
86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
136
 The crime of domestic violence is defined as “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause 
physical harm to a family or household member,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(A) (Baldwin 2005), and 
“No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to family or household member,” OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2919.25(B) (Baldwin 2005).  The crime of assault is defined as “No person shall knowingly 
cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s unborn,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2903.13(A) (Baldwin 2005), and “No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to another or to 
another’s unborn,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(B) (Baldwin 2005).
137
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(C).
138
 Assault can be elevated to a felony under specified circumstances, such as assaults committed with a 
deadly weapon or causing serious injury, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.11 (Baldwin 2005), or assaults by 
caretakers of functionally impaired persons or assaults against certain public service employees, OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (Baldwin 2005). 
139 Id. at § 2919.26.
140 Id. at § 2903.213.
141 Id. at § 2919.26(C)(1).  
142 Id. at § 2903.213(E)(2).
143 Id. at § 2919.26(E)(2).
144 Id. at § 3113.31.
145 Id. at § 3113.31(E)(3)(a).
146 Id. at § 3113.31(C).
147 Id. at § 3113.31(A)(3)-(4).
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the batterer to leave the home and grant sole possession of the residence to the 
victim;148 it may temporarily grant custody of the children to the victim;149 it may require 
the batterer to continue providing support to the family;150 it may force the batterer to 
allow the victim use of the family car;151 and it may require both the batterer and the 
victim to seek counseling.152
When a domestic violence charge is downgraded to an assault, the victim may 
still obtain a TPO against the abuser.  However, the victim may no longer have access 
to the long-lasting and comprehensive power of a CPO if the judge interprets the 
Amendment to prevent its application to unmarried cohabitants “living as a spouse.”
c.  Bail
Ohio law has special requirements for setting bail in domestic violence cases.  
The judge must consider, inter alia, the defendant’s history of domestic violence, the 
severity of the violence, the defendant’s mental health, and whether he or she has 
exhibited controlling behavior over the victim.153  Requiring the judge to consider these 
extra factors unique to domestic abuse ensures an appropriate bail amount will be set. 
d.  Other Consequences
Statistics and related funding of domestic violence programs could also be 
negatively affected.  The police are required to keep statistics on incidents of domestic 
violence, which are compiled into an annual statistical report.154  If unmarried couples 
were eliminated from the realm of domestic violence, the annual statistics would show a 
woefully inaccurate picture of the extent of domestic abuse in Ohio, likely leading to 
reduced funding for violence programs and shelters.
If the courts ultimately interpret the Marriage Amendment to bar unmarried 
couples from the protection of domestic violence laws, the harm of the Amendment will 
reach well beyond discrimination against gays by turning back the clock on domestic 
violence victims to eviscerate years of legislative and judicial progress.    
C.  Ohio Cases Challenging the Constitutionality of
148 Id. at § 3113.31(E)(1)(b).  
149 Id. at § 3113.31(E)(1)(d).  
150 Id. at § 3113.31(E)(1)(e).  
151 Id. at § 3113.31(E)(1)(h).  
152 Id. at § 3113.31(E)(1)(f).  
153
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.251(B) (Baldwin 2005).  
154 Id. at § 3113.32 .  
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Ohio’s Domestic Violence Law
Over thirty defendants have challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic violence 
laws.155  At least eleven lower courts have dismissed domestic violence charges after 
holding the Amendment renders the state’s domestic violence statute unconstitutional 
155 State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005), aff’d, No. 
2005-CA-47, 2006 WL 827395 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; 
affirmed by court of appeals); State v. Pelfrey, No. 20763, 2006 WL 827402 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) 
(motion to dismiss denied); State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), aff’d, No. 05AP-
446, 2006 WL 827411 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Ward, No. 2005-
CA-75, 2006 WL 758540 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; affirmed 
by court of appeals); State v. Brown, No. 2005CA00074, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 
March 13, 2006) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Puckett, No. 05CA48, 2006 WL 574308 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 10, 2006) (motion to dismiss denied); City of Cleveland v. Voies,  No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 
WL 1940135 (Ohio Cleveland Mun. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 23, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. 
McCaslin, No. 05 CR 71 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Columbiana County July 14, 2005), rev’d, No. 05 CO 44, 
2006 WL 459261 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by 
court of appeals); State v. Nixon, No. 22667, 2006 WL 52251 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2006) (motion to 
dismiss denied); State v. Bryant, Nos. CA2005-02-025, CA2005-04-086, 2005 WL 3526679 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 27, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (motion 
to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Edwards, No. 2005CA00129, 
2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6362 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Rexroad, 
Nos. 05 CO 36, 05 CO 52, 2005 WL 3489726 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted in 
lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Carswell, No. 05CR22077 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Warren 
County Mar. 30, 2005), rev’d, No. CA2005-04-047, 2005 WL 3358882 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2005) 
(motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals); City of Uhrichsville v. Losey, No. 
2005 AP 03 0028, 2005 WL 3361100 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. 
Adams, No. 2005 CA 00103, 2005 WL 3196850 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2005) (motion to dismiss 
denied); State v. Newell, No. 2004CA00264, 2005 WL 1364937 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2005) (motion to 
dismiss denied); Phelps v. Johnson, No. DV05 305642 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Nov. 28, 
2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Jenkins, No. B-0502848 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton County 
July 12, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Arnold, No. CR 2005 02 0621 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
Summit County June 10, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Abdellahi, No. 2005 CRB 6993 (Ohio 
Franklin County Mun. Ct. June 7, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Danley, No. 05 CRB00356 
(Ohio Fairborn Mun. Ct. May 25, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Pike, No. 05CRB00325 (Ohio 
Fairborn Mun. Ct. May 23, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Renner, No. CRB 05 00288 (Ohio 
Chillicothe Mun. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted); State v. Steineman, No. 2005 CR 0068, 
2005 WL 1940104 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted); State v. McIntosh, No. 
2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. 
Peterson, No. 2005 CR 873, 2005 WL 1940114 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005) (motion to dismiss 
granted); Hufford v. Clark, No. DV0500206 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton County Apr. 12, 2005), available 
at http://www.ohiodvresources.org/attinfo/tips/#Cat7 (follow “Unmarried Hamilton County Decision Issue 1 
Brief” hyperlink) (motion to dismiss denied); Gough v. Triner, No. 2005 DR 00041 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
Columbiana County Apr. 4, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted); Bloomfield v. Stearns, No. 2005-DV-12 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hancock County Mar. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.ohiodvresources.org/attinfo/tips/#Cat7 (follow “Bloomfield v. Stearns” hyperlink) (motion to 
dismiss denied); State v. Brown, No. 2004-CR-04436 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery County Mar. 11, 
2005) (motion to dismiss denied); City of Cleveland v. Knipp, No. 2004 CRB 039103, 2005 WL 1017620 
(Ohio Cleveland Mun. Ct. Mar. 10, 2005) (motion to dismiss denied); State v. Forte, No. CR 460137 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Feb. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.ohiodvresources.org/attinfo/tips/#Cat7 (follow “State of Ohio v. Forte” hyperlink) (motion to 
dismiss denied).  
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for unmarried cohabitants.156 Several of these lower court decisions granting dismissals
have been reversed by appellate courts.157  However, one court of appeals has resisted 
this trend and is affirming dismissals of the lower courts by holding that the domestic 
violence laws are unconstitutional under the recently-enacted Amendment.158 This split 
in authority will ultimately be decided by the Ohio Supreme Court.159
1.  Arguments that Domestic Violence Statute Is Unconstitutional
a.  Lower Court Decisions
The first decision to find the domestic violence law unconstitutional was State v. 
Burk in March 2005,160 which was later reversed by the court of appeals in December 
2005.161 Burk I held that Ohio’s domestic violence law conflicts with the Marriage 
156 State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005), aff’d, No. 
2005-CA-47, 2006 WL 827395 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; 
affirmed by court of appeals); State v. Ward, No. 2005-CA-75, 2006 WL 758540 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 
2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; affirmed by court of appeals); City of Cleveland v. Voies,  
No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135 (Ohio Cleveland Mun. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86317, 
2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by 
court of appeals); State v. McCaslin, No. 05 CR 71 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Columbiana County July 14, 2005), 
rev’d, No. 05 CO 44, 2006 WL 459261 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in lower 
court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (motion to dismiss 
granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Rexroad, Nos. 05 CO 36, 05 CO 52, 2005 
WL 3489726 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of 
appeals); State v. Carswell, No. 05CR22077 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Warren County Mar. 30, 2005), rev’d, No. 
CA2005-04-047, 2005 WL 3358882 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted in lower 
court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Renner, No. CRB 05 00288 (Ohio Chillicothe Mun. Ct. Apr. 
29, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted); State v. Steineman, No. 2005 CR 0068, 2005 WL 1940104 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted); State v. Peterson, No. 2005 CR 873, 2005 WL 
1940114 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted); Gough v. Triner, No. 2005 DR 
00041 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Columbiana County Apr. 4, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted).
157
 City of Cleveland v. Voies,  No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135 (Ohio Cleveland Mun. Ct. Mar. 
23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006) (motion to dismiss granted in 
lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. McCaslin, No. 05 CR 71 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
Columbiana County July 14, 2005), rev’d, No. 05 CO 44, 2006 WL 459261 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2006) 
(motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 
2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 20, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Rexroad, 
Nos. 05 CO 36, 05 CO 52, 2005 WL 3489726 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005) (motion to dismiss granted in 
lower court; reversed by court of appeals); State v. Carswell, No. 05CR22077 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Warren 
County Mar. 30, 2005), rev’d, No. CA2005-04-047, 2005 WL 3358882 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2005) 
(motion to dismiss granted in lower court; reversed by court of appeals).
158
 State v. Ward, No. 2005-CA-75, 2006 WL 758540 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d Mar. 24, 2006) (holding the 
domestic violence law recognizes a “quasi-marital relationship” by including unmarried individuals “living 
as a spouse” in violation of the recently-enacted Marriage Amendment); State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 
0091, 2005 WL 1940110 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005), aff’d, No. 2005-CA-47, 2006 WL 827395 
(Ohio Ct. App.-2d Mar. 31, 2006) (following Ward).  See infra Part V.C.1.b.
159
 State v. Ward, No. 2005-CA-75, 2006 WL 758540, at ¶ 7 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d Mar. 24, 2006)  .
160 State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 
2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
161 State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
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Amendment as it applies to unmarried cohabitants “living as a spouse.”162  In so ruling, 
the court downgraded the defendant’s felony domestic violence indictment to a 
misdemeanor assault.163
Burk I focused on the plain meaning of the words in the Amendment and statute, 
and concluded that the domestic violence laws recognize a legal status for unmarried 
individuals that “intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage” by including unmarried cohabitants “living as a spouse.”164  “Living as a 
spouse” is defined by cohabitation, which involves the sharing of familial or financial 
responsibilities and consortium, and therefore involves a relationship that functions like 
a marriage.165  The Amendment prohibits the state from recognizing any legal status for 
unmarried relationships that approximates marriage; thus, Burk held, the plain meaning 
of the Amendment prohibits the state from recognizing unmarried cohabitants who are 
“living as a spouse” because cohabitation is a relationship that mimics the qualities of 
marriage.166
The Burk I court discusses the breadth of the recognition clause as evidence that 
it intended to affect more than just same-sex marriage.  While the commonly-accepted 
intent of the second clause was to prohibit recognition of civil unions or other marriage 
substitutes, the court observes that the Amendment’s language does not restrict itself to 
same-sex marriage relationships.  Its explicit terms are “not so limited, but clearly is 
worded as broadly as possible, so as to encompass any quasi-marital relationships —
whether they be same-sex or opposite-sex.”167
Burk I dismissed voter intent as a factor in the analysis because there was “no 
way to divine the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, supported, or voted for 
it.”168  The court acknowledged they probably did not intend to affect domestic violence 
laws, but chalked it up as an “unfortunate example of the ‘law of unintended 
consequences’.”169 Other courts considering voter intent used evidence that voters 
were aware of the potential broad implications of the Amendment to support the 
conclusion that the Amendment renders the domestic violence law unconstitutional.170
In City of Cleveland v. Voies, the court also advances the theory that the 
proponents of the Amendment must have intended to discourage all types of 
cohabitation and restrict all nonmarital benefits because the Amendment purposefully 
162
 State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212, at ¶¶ 23-27 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d,
No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
163 Id. at ¶ 27.
164 Id. at ¶ 14.
165 Id. at ¶ 13-15.
166 Id. at ¶ 27.
167 Id. at ¶ 12.
168 Id. at ¶ 24.
169 Id.
170 State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005); State v. 
Steineman, No. 2005 CR 0068, 2005 WL 1940104, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005); City of 
Cleveland v. Voies,  No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135, at ¶¶ 3-8 (Ohio Cleveland Mun. Ct. Mar. 
23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006). 
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did not contain the protections found in the state’s existing DOMA that specified it would 
not “prohibit the extension of specific nonmarital benefits otherwise enjoyed by all 
persons, married or unmarried relationships.”171
b.  Appellate Decisions
The only appellate court to find the domestic violence law unconstitutional is the 
Second Appellate District.172  In contrast, appellate courts in the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth Appellate Districts have upheld the domestic violence law.173
The appellate court in State v. Ward placed great importance on the supremacy of the 
state constitution over statutory law, and emphasized that the constitution does not 
have to be deferentially construed to hold a statute valid.174 Ward determined that the 
Amendment’s recognition clause was intended to prevent the state and the courts from 
creating exceptions to the marriage laws and eroding “the concept of traditional 
marriage.”175  Viewing the statute through this lens, the court found the definition of 
“living as a spouse” to be similar to the definition of a marital relationship,176 and thus 
determined the “living as a spouse” requirement was the “sort of quasi-marital 
relationship” the Amendment was intended to prohibit.177
2.  Arguments that Domestic Violence Statute Is Constitutional 
a.  Burk II
The court of appeals reversed Burk after finding the lower court’s analysis flawed 
on several levels.  The trial court did not follow standard statutory interpretation when it 
failed to give the appropriate deference to the presumption of constitutionality of 
statutes enacted by the legislature178 and when it failed to reasonably interpret the laws 
so that they “both may stand.”179
Burk II noted the trial court’s failure to consider the intent behind both the 
Amendment and the domestic violence laws.  The court confirmed the intent of the 
171 City of Cleveland v. Voies,  No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135, at ¶ 6 (Ohio Cleveland Mun. 
Ct. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006).     
172 State v. Ward, No. 2005-CA-75, 2006 WL 758540 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d Mar. 24, 2006) (holding the 
domestic violence law recognizes a “quasi-marital relationship” by including unmarried individuals “living 
as a spouse” in violation of the recently-enacted Marriage Amendment); State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 
0091, 2005 WL 1940110 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005), aff’d, No. 2005-CA-47, 2006 WL 827395 
(Ohio Ct. App.-2d Mar. 31, 2006) (following Ward).  
173 State v. Rodgers, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 827411, at ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006)
(summarizing the appellate rulings to date on this issue).
174 State v. Ward, No. 2005-CA-75, 2006 WL 758540, ¶¶ 8-18 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006).
175 Id. at ¶ 27. 
176 Id. at ¶ 31-32 (describing the definition of cohabitation as the sharing of familial or financial 
responsibilities, and consortium, which the court found “could serve just as readily as a definition of the 
marital relationship”).
177 Id. at ¶ 33.
178
 State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812, at ¶ 16 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
179 Id. at ¶ 17.
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second clause was to prohibit the state from recognizing civil unions and other marriage 
substitutes.180  The trial court erred when it erroneously concluded domestic violence 
laws conferred a legal status on individuals without regard to the legislature’s true intent 
to provide protection to all cohabitating couples, regardless of marital status.181  Ohio’s 
domestic violence statute and case law are broad and encompass many relationships 
other than marital.182  Whether a couple is cohabitating turns on the facts of their 
relationship, not their legal status or whether they are married.183
The court of appeals in Burk II held “[b]ecause Ohio's domestic violence statute 
is predicated upon the factual determination of cohabitation -- and not the legal 
determination of marriage -- both [the Amendment] and Ohio's domestic violence statute 
may stand."184  The court then reinstated Burk’s felony domestic violence indictment.185
b.  Domestic Violence Statute Does Not Create or Require Marital Status
The legislature’s intent in enacting the domestic violence statute was to 
prosecute batterers and protect victims, not to establish marital status. 186 There is no 
evidence the legislature intended to create any legal status approximating marriage by 
selecting the phrase “living as a spouse” to define and include unmarried cohabitants in 
the state’s domestic violence laws.187 The term “living as a spouse” is simply a 
descriptive phrase used to define who falls under the statute and does not establish that 
the individuals have some form of marital status.188  Cohabitation is simply a “factual 
status that must be proven as an element of a crime.”189
Ohio’s domestic violence laws do not require cohabitants to be married in order 
to obtain protection under the law.190  In fact, the Hadinger decision explicitly rejected 
the argument that a lesbian defendant could not be charged with domestic violence 
because the cohabitants were women who could not be married and therefore could not 
180 Id. at ¶ 18.
181 Id. at ¶ 20.
182 Id. at ¶ 23.
183 Id. at ¶ 30.
184 Id. at ¶ 32.
185 Id. at ¶ 33.
186 State v. Carswell, No. CA2005-04-047, 2005 WL 3358882, at ¶ 20 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2005); 
State v. McIntosh, No. 2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099, at *5 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005).  See 
also State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997) (citing the Ohio Legislative Service Commission Analysis).
187 City of Cleveland v. Knipp, No. 2004 CRB 039103, 2005 WL 1017620, at *9 (Ohio Cleveland Mun. Ct. 
Mar. 10, 2005).
188 State v. Rodgers, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 827411, at ¶ 15 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006); State v. 
Nixon, No. 22667, 2006 WL 52251, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2006); Brief of Appellant at 26, State v. 
Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
189
 State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), aff’d, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 
827411 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006); Brief of Appellant at 2, State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 
3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
190 State v. Rodgers, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 827411, at ¶ 15 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006).
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be “living as a spouse.”191  The court’s extension of the domestic violence laws to same-
sex cohabitants who cannot marry under state law illustrates that marital status is not 
required or implied by use of the term “living as a spouse.”  
The domestic violence statute also does not create or extend a legal status to 
unmarried cohabitants by including them in the criminal domestic violence laws.192
When the state brings an unmarried couple under the protection and prosecution of the 
domestic violence laws, the state is not recognizing the couple as being married or 
sanctioning their relationship as being equivalent to marriage.  An unmarried couple 
does not suddenly find itself able to access the multitude of privileges available to 
married couples after being considered “living as spouses” by the court for domestic 
violence purposes.193  They may not inherit each other’s property intestate;194 they are 
not entitled to spousal support;195 they may not claim tax exemptions196 or file joint tax 
returns;197 and their communications are not privileged and excluded from testimony.198
c.  Ohio Public Policy Rejects Granting Legal Status for Unmarried Couples
The judicial and legislative treatment of unmarried couples in Ohio supports the 
state’s strong public policy against granting unmarried cohabitants any legal status, 
especially legal rights equivalent to marriage.199  The fact that the courts broadly 
interpret Ohio’s domestic violence laws to include unmarried couples demonstrates that 
the domestic violence laws are not in fact creating any legal status for cohabitants.
Ohio’s marriage statute specifically states that extending marital benefits to 
“nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or different sexes is against 
the strong public policy of this state.”200  Ohio expressly repealed its common-law 
marriage provision effective October 1991,201 which further reinforces that Ohio refuses 
to grant any marital benefits to couples who have not actually married.  While Ohio 
continues to recognize common-law marriages in existence prior to the date of repeal, it 
191 State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th 1991).  See also State v. Yaden, 692 
N.E.2d 1097, 1098, 1101 (Ohio 1997) (refuting a similar argument in a case involving a gay male 
relationship). 
192
 Brief of Appellant at 25, State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 
2005), rev’d, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
193 State v. Carswell, No. CA2005-04-047, 2005 WL 3358882, at ¶ 19 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2005).  See 
also Motion Contra Motion to Dismiss Ex-Parte Order and Petition for Civil Protective Order at 9, 
Bloomfield v. Stearns, No. 2005-DV-12 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.ohiodvresources.org/attinfo/tips/#Cat7 (follow “Bloomfield v. Stearns” hyperlink).  
194 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Baldwin 2005).  
195 Id. at § 3103.03.  
196 Id. at § 5747.025(A).  
197 Id. at § 5747.08(E).
198 Id. at § 2317.02(D).  
199 See STANLEY MORGANSTERN & BEATRICE SOWALD, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE OHIO DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS LAW § 2:69 (Thomson/West 2005) (discussing Ohio’s refusal to grant legal remedies to 
unmarried cohabitants).
200 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (C)(3) (Baldwin 2005).
201 Id. at § 3105.12.
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is likely these grandfathered common-law marriages are now unconstitutional under the 
Marriage Amendment.202
While many other states have judicially embraced some form of legal protection 
or equitable distribution for unmarried couples when they separate, such as constructive 
trusts or implied contracts, Ohio courts have repeatedly rejected any such legal 
protections for unmarried cohabitants.203
In Tarry v. Stewart,204 a woman attempted to convince an Ohio court to grant her 
such legal protection by invoking the state’s domestic violence laws.  The plaintiff was 
suing for equitable division of property after the termination of her fourteen-year 
cohabitation relationship.205  The plaintiff endeavored to prove that legal recognition of 
cohabitating couples is not against the public policy of Ohio by arguing that the 
domestic violence laws create an acknowledgement of unmarried relationships by 
providing protected status to persons “living as a spouse.”206  The court rejected this 
claim by stating that Ohio case law clearly holds that cohabitation without marriage does 
not create an implied contractual relationship.207  Thus, the court essentially refuted the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the state’s domestic violence laws created any form of legal 
relationship between unmarried couples that could establish a precedent for providing 
other legal rights.  This ruling would seem to contradict the holdings in the recent 
controversy that held Ohio’s domestic violence laws create a legal status for unmarried 
couples.
d.  Equal Protection of the Law
Two lower court rulings208 have held that interpreting the Amendment to bar 
unmarried cohabitants from the state’s domestic violence laws could be challenged 
202
 City of Cleveland v. Voies, No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135, at *6 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Mar. 23, 
2005), rev’d, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006). 
203
 Lauper v. Harold, 492 N.E. 2d 472, 473-74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “mere cohabitation 
without marriage” does not entitle assets or property to be divided upon separation because “cohabitation 
without benefit of marriage . . . does not create an implied contractual relationship” and the parties 
“elected not to marry prior to cohabitation and should have been prepared to bear the consequences”).  
See also Seward v. Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756, 757 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the Lauper ruling by 
refusing to divide property in a nine-year lesbian relationship where there was no marriage or similar 
contract); Haas v. Lewis, 456 N.E. 2d 512, 513-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (denying the right to loss of 
consortium to unmarried cohabitants because the right of consortium “is incident to marriage and cannot 
exist without marriage”); Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E. 2d 1, 6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to recognize 
a constructive trust or fiduciary relationship in a fourteen-year relationship where the wife contributed to 
the household both with her income and as a homemaker raising the unmarried couple’s child).
204
 Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E. 2d 1, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
205 Id. at 1-2.
206 Id. at 7.
207 Id.
208
 State v. Abdellahi, No. 2005 CRB 6993, at 6 (Ohio Franklin County Mun. Ct. June 7, 2005) (holding 
that interpreting the Amendment to bar unmarried couples would “arbitrarily subject certain victims to less 
protection based on their marital status or sexual orientation” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); 
Phelps v. Johnson, No. DV05 305642, at 2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Nov. 28, 2005) (holding 
that the domestic violence laws do create a legal status for unmarried cohabitants, but denying the 
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.209  The Equal 
Protection Clause ensures that all citizens shall receive equal treatment under the 
law,210 and the state may only infringe upon this protection if its distinction is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.211
The alleged purpose of the Amendment is to preserve heterosexual marriage 
and prevent same-sex marriage.212  This purported state interest is not furthered by 
denying protection to victims of domestic violence simply because they are not 
married.213  Interpreting the Amendment in such a way would deny protection of the law 
to an entire class of citizens without a rational governmental interest to justify the 
distinction.214  Unmarried cohabitants who have a child with the abuser would continue 
to receive protection from the state’s domestic violence laws because Ohio’s statute 
specifically includes this class in the statute without reference to cohabitation “as 
spouses.”215  Thus, the law would extend protection to an unmarried cohabitant who 
was beaten by the father of her child, but would not cover an unmarried cohabitant who 
did not have a child with the abuser.216  This nonsensical distinction serves no purpose 
other than to disadvantage the unmarried cohabitant who was wise enough to refrain 
from having children with the abuser.  “A law declaring that in general it shall be more 
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is 
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”217
The state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from all forms of 
domestic abuse and affording its citizens the full protection of the law.  Ohio courts have 
broadly interpreted the state’s domestic violence laws to include both unmarried 
homosexual and heterosexual couples.218  The state does not have a legitimate reason 
for taking away this important right from a whole class of citizens that currently enjoy the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges because it violates the Equal Protection Clause to draw a 
distinction between married and unmarried victims when the classification bears no rational relationship to 
the stated government interest). 
209 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
210 Id.
211
 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-34 (1996).
212
 State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812, at ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).  See also Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage, The Facts about Issue 1, 
http://www.ohiomarriage.com/Facts_About_Issue_1.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
213
 Brief of Amici Curiae Action Ohio Coal. of Battered Women et al. in Support of Appellee State of Ohio 
at 14, State v. McIntosh, No. 2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 18, 2005), appeal 
filed, No. CA-21093 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
214
 Motion Contra Motion to Dismiss Ex-Parte Order and Petition for Civil Protective Order at 11, 
Bloomfield v. Stearns, No. 2005-DV-12 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 24, 2005).
215 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(F)(1).
216
 State v. Abdellahi, No. 2005 CRB 6993, at 3 (Ohio Franklin County Mun. Ct. June 7, 2005).
217
 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
218 State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th 1991); State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 
875, 881 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), aff’d, No. 05AP-446, 2006 WL 827411 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006); 
State v. Linner, 665 N.E.2d 1180 (Ohio Hamilton Mun. Ct. 1996).
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full protection of the law.  The Amendment was intended to stop same-sex couples from 
marrying; it “was not created to shield perpetrators of domestic violence.”219
3.  Ohio Legislative Fix
The Ohio State Legislature is considering a bill that would remove the 
problematic “living as a spouse” definition from Ohio’s domestic violence law to dispel 
any potential conflict with the state constitution.220  Unfortunately, this would only correct 
the problem as it relates to domestic violence.  The broad, prejudicial implications of the 
Amendment cannot be fixed with clean-up legislation like a statute.  The problems with 
the Ohio Amendment will remain until the courts strike it down or the voters go through 
the arduous process of repealing or amending it.
D.  Other Unintended Consequences of the Marriage Amendment
Besides the twisted domestic violence interpretation , the Marriage Amendment is 
being distorted in other ways not intended by the voters.  A court-sanctioned joint 
custody agreement between a former lesbian couple in Ohio is being challenged as 
invalid under the state constitution by the child’s biological mother, who wishes to stop 
visitation rights for her former partner.221
As expected, the Amendment is being wielded to abolish domestic partnership 
rights for same-sex couples in Ohio.  A Republican State Representative, Tom 
Brinkman, Jr., has filed a complaint seeking to enjoin Miami University (Oxford, Ohio) 
from offering same-sex domestic partner benefits to its employees.222  The suit alleges 
that the University is creating a legal status for unmarried relationships in violation of the 
state constitution by providing benefits to “marriage-mimicking” same-sex 
relationships.223  It is no surprise that the attorney who drafted Ohio’s Amendment is 
representing Brinkman in the suit.224  This bolsters the argument that the true intent of 
the drafters was to dismantle domestic partnership rights for gays and lesbians; yet they 
failed to clearly communicate that in either the Amendment language or the voter 
information pamphlet so that Ohio voters could make an informed choice about whether 
they wanted to strip away these types of rights from gay couples.  
Other states have also addressed the issue of whether domestic partnership 
benefits are preempted by the marriage amendments.  After Michigan passed its 
219
 State v. Pike, No. 05CRB00325, at 2 (Ohio Fairborn Mun. Ct. May 23, 2005).
220
 H.B. 161, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
221
 Fairchild v. Fairchild, No. 01JU-03-2542 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin County filed Feb. 14, 2005). 
222
 Brinkman v. Miami Univ. (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Butler County Nov. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/BrinkmanComplaint.pdf.
223 Id. at 2.
224
 David R. Langdon.  See Citizens for Community Values, Rep. Tom Brinkman Sues Miami University 
over Domestic Partner Benefits Suit Claims Policy Violates Ohio’s Marriage Protection Amendment, 
http://www.ccv.org/CCV_Perspective-20051206.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
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marriage amendment in 2004,225 the Governor suspended domestic partnership 
benefits for public employees pending judicial clarification on the effects of the 
amendment.226  The Michigan Attorney General issued an opinion that the amendment 
barred the state from granting domestic partnership benefits,227 but the circuit court 
disagreed.  The court held that receiving health care benefits is not a statutory right or 
benefit of marriage, but rather is a contractual benefit of employment, and thus is not 
prohibited by the amendment.228
Alaska’s Supreme Court similarly ruled that Alaska’s same-sex marriage ban 
amendment does not preclude the state from offering benefits to same-sex partners of 
public workers.229  The court asserted that just because “the Marriage Amendment 
effectively prevents same-sex couples from marrying does not automatically permit the 
government to treat them differently in other ways.”230
VI.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The majority of Ohio appellate courts seem to be logically resolving the 
constitutionality of the domestic violence laws by considering the intent of the Marriage 
Amendment and by utilizing standard practices of statutory interpretation.  But this 
resolves only the domestic violence issue – and only in Ohio.  Other states might decide 
that granting protection to unmarried victims of domestic violence conflicts with their 
state marriage amendment.231  The breadth and ambiguity of these amendments make 
countless other destructive interpretations possible.  Unmarried couples in Ohio, both 
gay and straight, will continue to look over their proverbial shoulders, wondering if their 
private relationships and agreements will be attacked as unconstitutional under the 
Marriage Amendment. 
     This has especially broad implications for gay and lesbian couples.  Unmarried 
heterosexual couples always have the option to marry if they want to enjoy the legal 
protections afforded by marriage; homosexual couples have no such choice.  While a 
heterosexual spouse automatically has the right to make medical decisions, maintain 
custody of the children, and inherit property, same-sex couples do not have such 
automatic rights and must enter into private contractual agreements in an attempt to 
obtain some semblance of these legal protections automatically bestowed on all 
heterosexual married couples.
225 MICH. CONST. art. I, §25 (“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for 
future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only 
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”).
226
 ACLU, Michigan Marriage Amendment Does Not Reach the Workplace, Judge Rules, 
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/20055prs20050927.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
227
 7171 Op. Att’y Gen., 2005 Mich. AG LEXIS 4, at *25-28  (2005).
228
 Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040, at *4-7 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
27, 2005).
229
 Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 795 (Alaska 2005).
230 Id. at 787.
231
 A suit has been filed in Utah arguing a civil protection order for an unmarried domestic violence victim 
violates the state’s recently-enacted marriage amendment.  See Dee McAree, Domestic Violence Laws 
Clouded by Gay Marriage Ban, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 31, 2005, at P6.
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This is perhaps the cruelest consequence of the marriage amendments.  Not 
only do they ensure that gays cannot marry, but they proceed to strip away the private 
legal protections that gays and lesbians are forced to create for themselves in the 
absence of their ability to obtain them through marriage.  
Ironically, the marriage amendments perpetuate the exact social damage that 
they purport to prevent.232  Allowing homosexual couples to form legally-recognized 
marriages would provide stability to society and legal protection for their children, in the 
same way that heterosexual marriage benefits society.233  By denying same-sex 
couples access to these legal protections and incumbent responsibilities, the states are 
actually contributing to the social instability that they seek to prevent.  
Further, these amendments are likely to have a corrosive effect on how society 
views gays and lesbians.  By enshrining discrimination against homosexuals in their 
constitutions, states are publicly acknowledging that gays and lesbians do not deserve 
full equal protection under the law.  This state-sanctioned bigotry implies gay people are 
“second class citizens”234 not worthy of equality and sets an example that it is 
acceptable for society to treat gays in a disparate fashion, thus leading to more 
discrimination against gays and lesbians.235
The amendments are also likely to have a fiscal impact on the states and private 
citizens.  The broad amendments are fodder for judicial action due to the ambiguous 
language that is susceptible to far-flung interpretations, as evidenced by the dozens of 
domestic violence cases filed in Ohio.  Private citizens will also be burdened with 
litigation costs if they have to fight to retain their legal rights that they had prior to the 
Amendment.     
A.  Future of State Marriage Amendments
Other states have apparently not learned the lessons of Ohio’s Amendment.  
Several states have measures pending to amend their state constitutions in the 
future.236
The State of California has several marriage initiatives pending,237 with at least 
two groups withdrawing because they were unable to gather the necessary signatures 
to get the initiative on the 2006 ballot.238  The State of California, however, is being 
232
 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1004 (D. Neb. 2005) (appeal pending).
233 Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962-64, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
234 Id. at 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding the state’s ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional; stating the 
Massachusetts Constitution “forbids the creation of second class citizens”). 
235 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (arguing that making homosexual conduct illegal leads 
to further discrimination).
236
 Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
237 Office of the Attorney General, State of Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, Initiative Measures Active, 
http://www.caag.state.ca.us/initiatives/activeindex.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).      
238 Lee Romney, Same-Sex Marriage Foes Falter in ’06 Ballot Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005.  
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honest about the true purpose and potential consequences of the pending initiatives.  
The California Attorney General accurately entitled one measure: “Marriage. Elimination 
of Domestic Partnership Rights. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.”  The proponent of 
the marriage initiative alleged the title and summary were misleading and filed a petition 
to have the language changed.239  The court denied the petition, holding that the title 
and summary were accurate.240
The California Attorney General’s Office addressed the initiative with realistic 
honesty in describing the impact and ramifications of the proposed amendment.  The 
title and summary stated the amendment would eliminate domestic partnerships, and 
void and restrict domestic partner rights.  It proceeded to identify twelve domestic 
partnership rights that would be affected if the initiative passed.241
The proponents of the amendment fought to prevent this frank assessment from 
being published likely because they feared the voters of California would defeat the 
measure if they knew it eliminated domestic partnerships, which have public support in 
California.242  Instead of the Attorney General’s description, the proponents requested 
that the title and summary read: “Protection of Marriage. Government Prohibited from 
Abolishing or Diminishing Marriage” with no specific mention of destroying California’s 
progressive domestic partnership law.243
One cannot help but notice the irony of the proponents’ challenge to the Attorney 
General’s summary.  They allege it is “false and misleading” and “not a true and 
impartial statement of the purpose of the measure,”244 when these were the very sins 
perpetrated against the voters of Ohio.  The proponents’ method of operation is to 
introduce amendments with vague and ambiguous language that can later be 
interpreted to take away more rights than they claimed it would during the campaign.  
The California Attorney General’s Office serves as a model for how to deal with 
ambiguous marriage amendments.  If proponents insist on continuing to bring forth 
these broad and discriminatory amendments, then the states must force them to be 
honest about their implications.  It is highly unlikely the voters of Ohio would have voted 
for the Amendment if there had been an official title that read: “Eliminates Domestic 
Violence Protection for Unmarried Individuals.”   
239
 Bowler v. Lockyer, No. 05CS01123 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/documents.html?record=1768.  
240
 Bowler v. S.C. (Lockyer), No. S137625, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 11296 (Cal. Oct. 4, 2005).  See also Press 
Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Court Confirms Petition Language For Anti-Gay Measure 
Must Disclose Impact On Domestic Partners (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.nclrights.org/releases/pr-
petition_language090105.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
241
 Petition for Writ of Mandate to Amend Title and Summary Exhibit B, Bowler v. Lockyer, No. 
05CS01123 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2005) (stating the proposed amendment would affect domestic 
partnership rights in areas such as “ownership and transfer of property, inheritance, adoption, medical 
decisions, child custody and child support, health and death benefits, insurance benefits, hospital 
visitation, employment benefits, and recovery for wrongful death and other tort remedies”).
242 Lee Romney, Same-Sex Marriage Foes Falter in ’06 Ballot Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005.  
243
 Petition for Writ of Mandate to Amend Title and Summary at 9-10, Bowler v. Lockyer, No. 05CS01123 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2005).
244 Id.
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VII.  CONCLUSION
In their rush to take away rights from a minority class of citizens, the voters of 
Ohio also inadvertently trampled on the rights of the majority.  Most Ohioans did not 
hesitate to enshrine discrimination against homosexuals in the state constitution; yet 
found it unacceptable when their broad strokes of bigotry at the polls reached out to 
affect heterosexual couples victimized by domestic violence.  While the courts are 
unlikely to allow this unintended consequence affecting domestic violence victims to 
proceed, it is unfortunate that the intended consequence of intolerance towards gays 
and lesbians will continue.    
Amending constitutions to remove civil liberties is not only offensive to the notion 
of justice, but it is also counter to the “basic tenets of our constitutional democracy” 
where rights are enumerated in our Constitution, not abolished.245  The ban on gay 
marriage is often compared to the anti-miscegenation laws that prohibited interracial 
marriage.246  Many states had these laws until the Supreme Court struck them down in 
1967.247  There have been three attempts in our nation’s history to amend the United 
States Constitution to ban interracial marriage, all of which failed.248  This demonstrates 
why constitutions should not be amended to restrict rights based on the social 
prejudices of the day.249  At one point in our nation’s history, slavery was legal and 
interracial marriage was prohibited.  Thankfully our country continues to evolve, and the 
prejudices of today will become the history of tomorrow.  The nation’s attitude toward 
gays and lesbians continues to mature, with polls revealing a growing acceptance of 
homosexuality across all age groups, with the youngest generation most accepting.250
It is unfortunate that some states have elected to freeze their current prejudices into the 
permanence of their state constitutions.  If such amendments are going to be made, the 
voters should at least be aware of what they are voting for.      
“You can only protect your liberties in this world by protecting the other man’s freedom.  
You can only be free if I am free.”  - Clarence Darrow
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248 Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution Regarding 
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